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RECENT DECISIONS
answered by the Court has been, in the opinion of the writer, cor-
rectly decided by the lower tribunals.' 8
In the most significant passage of the opinion, the Court stated
that where both damages and profits are proven, the court, in its
discretion, may disregard such proof and award statutory damages. 19
But when the copyright owner can prove both his damages and the
infringer's profits, the underlying basis for the "in lieu" clause is
eliminated. To allow a court in such cases to summarily dismiss the
true amount of damage and substitute a discretionary amount, far
exceeds the scope of the statute. If, therefore, the direct holding is
followed, and the dicta disregarded, the instant case will have greatly
furthered the clarification of this troublesome statute.
X
CORPORATIONS - CUMULATIVE VOTING PROVISION VOIns RE-
MOVAL BY-LAw.-Pursuant to a by-law providing for such action,
a corporate director was removed without cause, and an election was
held to fill the vacancy. Petitioner, owner of forty per cent of the
voting stock of the corporation, brought an action pursuant to Section
25 of the General Corporation Law - to set aside the election on the
ground that it violated her rights under a cumulative voting pro-
vision adopted subsequent to the enactment of the by-law. Held:
the adoption of a cumulative voting provision invalidated the by-law
insofar as it provided for the removal of a director without cause.
Matter of Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 106
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
The purpose of cumulative voting is to afford minority interests
the opportunity to secure representation on the board of directors; 2
and it appears that express statutory authorization is a necessary pre-
requisite to its use.3 In gauging the effect of a cumulative voting
18 See note 12 supra.
19 See Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., .supra note 14, at 226.
"We think that the statute empowers the trial court in its sound discretion to de-
termine whether on all the facts a recovery upon proven profits and damages
or one estimated within the statutory limits is more just." Ibid. (emphasis
added).
"Upon the application of any member aggrieved by an election . . . the
supreme court . . . shall forthwith hear the proofs and allegations of the
parties, and confirm the election or order a new election, as justice may require."
2 See Matter of Jamaica Consumers' Ice Co., 190 App. Div. 739, 741, 180
N. Y. Supp. 384, 386 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 516, 129 N. E. 897 (1920) ;
see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 402 (Rev. ed. 1946); PRASHXM, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CopoRATixoNs 481-90 (2d ed. 1949).3 See Matter of Brophy, 13 N. J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128, 129 (Sup. Ct.
1935). But see Quilliam v. Hebbronville Utilities, Inc., 241 S. W. 2d 225
1953 ]
358 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 27
statute, it is proper to consider whether the provision guarantees 4
or merely permits 5 exercise of the privilege. Where of the guar-
antying type, it may properly be held that a by-law enabling a ma-
jority interest to remove a director without cause 6 is subordinate
to the purpose underlying the provision, and therefore inapplicable
to minority interest directors who are innocent of official misconduct.7
Where, however, the authorization is merely permissive, it is ques-
tionable whether such a removal by-law so conflicts with a public
policy favoring cumulative voting that the courts should nullify the
by-law in the absence of legislative authority.8
The New York provision 9 falls within the permissive type, and
thus depends for its existence on its express inclusion in the orig-
inal charter, or on an amendment ratified by the holders of two-
thirds of the voting stock.10 But the mere inclusion of the provision
in the original charter, or its subsequent addition thereto, does not
give the minority a vested right to vote cumulatively. The charter
may be subsequently amended to remove the provision," or its effec-
tiveness can be frustrated by the reduction 12 and classification 13 of
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (by-law providing for cumulative voting without statu-
tory authority therefor amended to provide for straight voting).
4E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §2235 (Deering, 1948); MIcH. ComP. LAWS§ 450.651 (1948) ; MINN. STAT. § 301.26(3) (1949) ; OHIO CODE ANN. § 8623-50a(Baldwin Supp. 1948-52); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-505 (Purdon Supp.
1952) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 23.32.070 (1951).
3 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 32B (1950); NaV. COmP. LAWS § 1629(Hillyer, 1929) ; N. Y. STOCc CoR. LAW § 49. For full list of states and type
statute adopted, see WILLIAMS, CUMU.ATIVE VOTING FOR DImcos 7-9 (1951).
6 The power, while given statutory approval in several states (e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 301.29 (1949); OHIO CODE ANN. § 8623-56 (Baldwin Supp. 1948-52);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-405 (Purdon, 1938)), can be exercised in New
York without such authority. Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N. Y.
Supp. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (case contains concise summary of rules applicable
to removal of directors). In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that there
is no such common-law right. See Walsh v. State, 199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45, 47
(1917); see Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. v. Hampson, 23 Ch. D. 1 (1882)
passim.
7 See Bowes and De Bow, Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors
of Corporations, 21 MINN. L. REv. 351, 367 (1937).
8 The by-laws of a corporation constitute a contract among the share-
holders. See Weisblum v. LiFalco Mfg. Co., 193 Misc. 473, 476, 84 N. Y. S.
2d 162, 166 (Sup. Ct. 1947). It would appear that the court, in the absence
of a violation of statute or public policy, would be impairing the obligation
of contracts by substituting its judgment for that of the parties and in effect
altering their contract.
9 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 49.
20 N. Y. STocK CORP. LAW §§ 35(2) (D), 37(1) (C) (2).
11 Ibid. For a decision allowing dissenting stockholder right of appraisal,
see Application of New York Hanseatic Corp., 200 Misc. 530, 103 N. Y. S.
2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
12 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 35(2) (G), 37(1) (C) (1) (f).
IId. §§35(2) (J), 37(1) (C) (2); see Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co.,
137 App. Div. 671, 122 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st Dep't 1910); WILLIAMS, CUMrU-
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directors. By the latter method, the statutory provisions of even
those states which guaranty the privilege can be circumvented. 14
A provision for the removal of directors without cause is also
used to achieve the same result. Of the eight states 1r which have
legislatively recognized this conflict, six have refrained from invali-
dating the removal by-law, but have merely limited its use.' 6 It is
significant that of these six states, five guarantee the cumulative vot-
ing right."7 It would appear, then, that in New York, whose public
policy is not as strong'18 as the aforementioned five states, it should
not be held as a matter of law that the adoption of a cumulative voting
provision ipso facto invalidates the removal by-law. Conceding,
arguendo, that under the particular facts (forty per cent dissenting
stockholder) the decision achieved substantial justice, its scope was
too broad in unqualifiedly invalidating the by-law. To hold that the
adoption of a cumulative voting provision ipso facto abrogates the
removal by-law might well work a clearly inequitable result. In a
situation where the director to be removed was elected by the ma-
jority, rather than by the dissenting minority's exercise of their cumu-
lative voting powers, the automatic abrogation rule would operate to
prevent the majority from removing their own director, and thus
frustrate their intention in originally enacting the removal clause.
A more logical solution to the problem would provide that only
where the objecting stockholder wields sufficient votes which, if
cumulatively voted, could elect a director should the by-law be sus-
pended; but that in all other cases it would remain valid and opera-
tive. Authority for such a position may be found in the legislation
of six '9 of those eight states which have provided against such a
contingency. In only one 20 of those states has the legislature seen
fit to do what the decision in the instant case effects. If the
LATIVE VOTING FOR DRECTORS 48 (1951). For an interesting discussion of
classification and its effect on cumulative voting provisions, see Note, 56 DICK.
L. Riv. 330 (1952).
14 Some states, however, have provided against this possibility and prohibit
reduction or classification which would have the effect of defeating the cumu-
lative voting provision. See, e.g., MIcH. Comp. LAWS §450.13(3) (1943).
's California, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania
and Washington.
18 See note 19 infra.
17 California, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington.
18 Prior to the decision in the instant case, the most that could be said with
reference to the public policy of New York concerning cumulative voting was
that it was neutral. "We find in these sections of the statute [authorizing
cumulative voting] a legislative declaration that provision for cumulative voting
is not against public policy. . . ." Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Co.,
265 N. Y. 416, 420, 193 N. E. 253, 255 (1934).
'9 CAL. CORP. CODE § 810 (Deering, 1948); MINN. STAT. § 301.29 (1949);
NEv. Comp. LAws § 1632 (Hillyer, 1929): OHIO CODE ANN. § 8623-56 (Baldwin
Supp. 1948-52); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-405 (Purdon, 1938); WASH.
Rav. CODE § 23.36.040 (1951). See W=Lixtrs, op. cit. supra note 13, at 56.2 0 LA. REv. STAT. tit. 12. § 34C(4) (1950).
1953 ]
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legislatures of various states can disagree on the method of solving
this problem, it is submitted that the court's action in the instant case
was improper as an undue usurpation of the legislative function,
especially since it chose the least logical of the several possible
solutions.
CoRPoRATIoNs-Is ACTION TO COMPEL DECLARATION OF Divi-
DEND DERIVATIVE ?-In an action by a stockholder against a corpora-
tion and its directors to compel the declaration of a dividend, the
corporation moved for an order requiring plaintiff to provide security
for expenses, on the ground that the action was derivative within the
meaning of the New York statute.' The motion was granted.2 In
affirming, the Appellate Division held that the present suit is within
the statute since it is an action brought in the right of the corporation,
and not in the personal right of the stockholder.3 Gordon v. Elliman,
280 App. Div. 655, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (1st Dep't 1952).
A "derivative" action, cognizable only in Equity,4 is a suit by
a stockholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.5 As conditions
precedent to its institution and maintenance, the plaintiff must allege
and prove that the corporation has been damaged, and a cause of
action exists in its favor; 1 that a demand has been made, but the
corporation refuses to commence the action; 7 and that he was a stock-
holder at the time of the transaction of which he complains.8 The
corporation, of necessity, is made a party defendant, 9 since the relief
1 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b.
2 Gordon v. Elliman, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
3 Callahan, J., dissenting.
'See Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N. Y. 257, 263, 179 N. E. 487, 489 (1932).
5 See Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945) ; see Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U. S. 450 (1881) (comprehensive treatment of necessary elements of
a derivative action).
6Waters v. Horace Waters & Co., 201 N. Y. 184, 94 N. E. 602 (1911);
Lifshutz v. Adams, 285 N. Y. 180, 33 N. E. 2d 83 (1941); Moriarty v. James
Butler Grocery Co., 261 App. Div. 20, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 105 (1st Dep't 1940),
aff'd mere., 286 N. Y. 687, 37 N. E. 2d 36 (1941) ; Scheinman v. National Con-
tainer Corp., 165 Misc. 267, 300 N. Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
7 Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455 (1903);
NY PA NJ Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 23 F. Supp. 313 (S. D.
N. Y. 1938) ; see Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, appeal dismissed, 106
U. S. 3 (1882) (if demand shown to be futile, stockholder may dispense with
it); Dunphy v. Travelers' Newspaper Ass'n, 146 Mass. 495, 16 N. E. 426
(1888) (plaintiff failed to show futility of demand).8 N. Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 61 (he may also show that his stock thereafter
devolved upon him by operation of law).
9 Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873) ; see Jones v. Van Heusen
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